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Introduction 
 
Behavioural scientists have shown a longstanding interest in understanding and 
describing the psychology of individuals who become involved in terrorism (Borum, 
2004; Davis & Cragin, 2009; Horgan, 2005; Victoroff & Kruglanski, 2009). 
Understanding the causes, motivations and determinants of terrorist behaviour poses an 
enormous challenge, but pursuing this knowledge is vital to countering violent 
extremism's threat to global security. This chapter provides an overview of the major 
findings in this area and an account of our current understanding, introducing several 
concepts addressed in detail in subsequent chapters.  It moves away from single-factor 
explanations and finger pointing at ―root causes,‖ and aims toward a more diverse and 
dynamic view based on pathways into and through terrorist engagement and on how 
terrorist groups form, function, and fail.  
 
 
Motivation and Mentation 
 
Psychological researchers – like many in the general public – have been preoccupied with 
the notion of terrorist motivation (Crenshaw, 1986; Helmus, 2009; Hudson, 1999; 
Horgan, 2005; Victoroff, 2005).  Acts of terrorism are relatively uncommon, often 
shocking, and sometimes self-destructive.   They seem to defy easy explanation. No 
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psychological theory has emerged to explain all types of violence, and terrorism is a 
distinct form of violence. It is most often deliberate (not impulsive), strategic, and 
instrumental; it is linked to and justified by ideological (e.g., political, religious) 
objectives and almost always involves a group or multiple actors/supporters (Crenshaw, 
1986, 1988; Laqueur, 2003). These issues all add complexity to the construction of 
terrorism as a form of violence and challenge the emergence of a unifying explanatory 
theory. 
 
Even accounting for the influence of religion or ideology, it is vexing to discern how and 
why someone would come to adopt beliefs and behaviours that support his or her 
engagement in subversive and terrorist activity, particularly violence toward civilian non-
combatants. Since the late 1960s, the academic research community has sought answers 
to these questions by analyzing a variety of individual, interpersonal, socio-cultural, and 
even inter-state influences (Victoroff & Kruglanski, 2009; Horgan, 2005).   
 
Early efforts tended to predominantly focus on the individual level, assuming that the 
aberrant behaviour so prominently associated with the dramatic consequences of 
terrorism must reflect some mental or personality abnormality (Schmid & Jongman, 
1988). This thinking led some to propose clinical explanations and gave rise to a 
multitude of attempts to identify a unique terrorist profile.   However, forty years of 
terrorism research has firmly debunked the notion that only ―crazy‖ people engage in 
terrorism and has yet to reveal a meaningful, stable, terrorist profile (Borum, 2004; 
Crenshaw, 1992; Horgan, 2008).     
 
Research on the relationship between psychopathology and terrorism has been nearly 
unanimous in its conclusion that mental illness and abnormality are typically not critical 
factors in terrorist behaviour (Borum, 2004; Crenshaw, 1992; Horgan, 2008; Silke, 1998). 
Studies have found that the prevalence of mental illness among samples of incarcerated 
terrorists is as low as or lower than in the general population (Ruby, 2002). Moreover, 
although terrorists often commit heinous acts, they would rarely be considered classic 
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―psychopaths1.‖ Terrorists typically have some connection to principles or ideology as 
well as to other people (including other terrorists) who share them. Psychopaths, 
however, do not form such connections, nor would they be likely to sacrifice themselves 
(including dying) for a cause (Martens, 2004).  
 
Research also has not found or produced any favourable prospects of identifying either a 
―terrorist personality‖, or any accurate psychological ―terrorist profile‖ (Horgan, 2003).  
This consistent pattern of empirical findings probably comes as no surprise to many 
psychological researchers who are aware that personality traits alone tend not to be very 
good predictors of behaviour.  Fortunately, with very few exceptions, most contemporary 
social/behavioural scientists studying terrorism have moved on (Silke, 1998; Horgan, 
2005).   
 
Building on prior studies, psychological researchers have realized that we are unlikely to 
find a new understanding of radicalization in static, ‗trait-based‘ effects, but that viewing 
terrorism as a complex and dynamic ―process‖ is much more promising (Horgan, 2008). 
At this juncture, however, the exact nature of that process remains poorly understood. 
Focusing on ―vulnerabilities‖ to terrorism seems to be more promising and useful than 
looking for unique personality traits.  Vulnerabilities may be viewed as ―factors that point 
to some people having a greater openness to increased engagement than others‖ (Horgan, 
2005, p.101).   Rather than being simple causes, these vulnerabilities may be leveraged as 
possible sources of motivation or as mechanisms for acquiring or hardening one‘s 
militant ideology.  Three commonly occurring vulnerabilities are:  
 
(1) perceived injustice/humiliation;  
(2) need for identity; and  
(3) need for belonging (Borum, 2004).  
 
                                            
1
 Psychopaths are persons who possess both a pervasive and persistent history of antisocial behaviour and 
severe, endogenous emotional/affective deficits such as callousness and lack of empathy and remorse.  
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Social scientists have recognized perceived injustice and humiliation as central factors in 
understanding violence generally and terrorism specifically, dating  back to some of the 
earliest writings.  In the mid-1970s, Hacker (1976) concluded that ―remediable injustice 
is the basic motivation for terrorism‖.  Similarly, an individual‘s search for identity may 
draw him or her to extremist or terrorist organizations in a variety of ways. The 
absolutist, ―black and white‖ nature of most extremist ideologies is often attractive to 
those who feel overwhelmed by the complexity and stress of navigating a complicated 
world.   Without struggling to define oneself or discern personal meaning, an individual 
may choose to define his or her identity simply through group membership, or 
identification with a cause (Taylor & Louis, 2004).  Finally, in radical extremist groups, 
many prospective terrorists find not only a sense of meaning, but also a sense of 
belonging, connectedness and affiliation. Indeed, Crenshaw (1988, p.59) argues that ―for 
the individuals who become active terrorists, the initial attraction is often to the group, or 
community of believers, rather than to an abstract ideology or to violence.‖  
 
 
Pathways to Terrorism 
 
The pathways to, and motives for, terrorism are quite varied and diverse. Different people 
connect with violent ideologies and groups for different reasons at different times. For the 
individual, the process is often framed as comprising phases of radicalization, 
engagement (in terrorism), and disengagement. At the group/organization level, the 
corresponding processes are recruitment, mobilization and demobilization.   
Understanding these processes of becoming and being a terrorist does not lend itself to 
simple, linear, sequential analysis (Horgan, 2008). Alternatively, by using a ―pathway‖ 
approach, terrorism is not viewed as “the product of a single decision but the end result 
of a dialectical process that gradually pushes an individual toward a commitment to 
violence over time” (McCormick, 2003 p.492).   
 
Prior research also supports the general proposition that no single pathway or theory 
exists that would satisfactorily explain how all – or even most – people come to adopt 
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violent extremist ideologies ad engage in violent action (e.g. Borum, 2004; Horgan, 
2008). Walter Laqueur (2003, p.22) has said of terrorism that the quest for a ―general 
theory‖ is misguided, because: ―Many terrorisms exist, and their character has changed 
over time and from country to country.‖  This seems to be equally true for the 
radicalization process itself.  Moreover, researchers have begun to distinguish between 
reasons for joining, remaining in, and leaving terrorist organizations, finding that 
motivations may be different at each stage, and not even necessarily related to each other.  
 
Conceptual Approaches:  Several efforts have been made, however, to articulate a 
general sequence of stages, events or issues that might apply across and within group 
types. These are mainly conceptual models offering a logical narrative of a ―typical‖ 
transformative process, often with reference to a particular extremist group.   
 
One conceptual approach, for example, describes a four-stage process of acquiring or 
developing a ―terrorist mindset‖ (Borum, 2003), understanding that this mindset may be 
the result, rather than the cause, of joining an extremist group. The individual-actor 
model attempts to explain how grievances and vulnerabilities are transformed into hatred 
of a target group, and how hatred is transformed – for some - into a justification or 
impetus for violence.  Fundamentally, the process begins by framing some unsatisfying 
event, condition, or grievance (It’s not right) as being unjust (It’s not fair). The injustice 
is blamed on a target policy, person, or nation (It’s your fault). The responsible party is 
then vilified – often demonized – (You’re Evil) which facilitates moral disengagement 
and drives an impetus for aggression.  This particular model was developed, though, as a 
training heuristic for law enforcement, not as a formal social science theory.   
 
Alternatively, Fathali Moghaddam (2005) uses the metaphor of a "Staircase‖ to describe 
the process of becoming a terrorist.  Like most theories, feelings of discontent and 
perceived adversity/deprivation are a platform for stepping initially onto the path to 
terrorism, though fewer people ascend to each successive level.  In the beginning, 
according to his model, an individual‘s attempts to alleviate adversity and improve 
her/his situation have been unsuccessful, leading to feelings of frustration and aggression, 
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which are displaced onto some perceived causal agent (who is then regarded as an 
enemy).  As anger toward the enemy builds, some become increasingly sympathetic 
towards the justifications for violence and toward the terrorist groups that act against the 
enemy.  Some of those sympathizers eventually join an extremist group, organization or 
movement that advocates for, and perhaps engages in, terrorist violence.  At the ―top‖ or 
final level are those who have joined, overcome barriers to violent action, and actually 
commit a terrorist act (Moghaddam, 2005).   
 
The application of Social Movement Theory (SMT) to understanding terrorism represents 
an approach with a deeper theoretical grounding, greater social-contextual emphasis, and 
empirical support. Donatella Della Porta (1995) is among the first serious terrorism 
researchers to connect SMT concepts to violent extremism in her studies of the Italian 
and German militants.  More recently, Quintan Wiktorowicz (2003, 2005) has applied 
SMT in extensive field work in the UK to understand how people came to join a militant 
jihadist group (Al-Muhajiroun) based in a Western democracy.   
 
Wiktorowicz concurs with the general principle that ―joining the jihad‖ and becoming a 
terrorist are processes that evolve over time.  They rarely occur as a sudden, discrete 
decision.  Importantly, he sees the process as one of persuasion involving ongoing 
interactions between the recruit and the members (Wiktorowicz, 2005).  His SMT-based 
model has four key components.  A breakdown at any stage can divert the individual 
from a path to joining or ultimately participating.  Wiktorowicz describes those stages as 
follows: 
 
1. ―Cognitive Opening—an individual becomes receptive to the possibility of 
new ideas and worldviews;  
2. Religious Seeking—the individual seeks meaning through a religious 
idiom;  
3. Frame Alignment—the public representation proffered by the radical 
group ―makes sense‖ to the seeker and attracts his or her initial interest;  
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4. Socialization—the individual experiences religious lessons and activities 
that facilitate indoctrination and identity-construction. The latter process 
often includes ideological precepts that tie the individual‘s self-interest to 
the risky activism of the movement‖ (Wiktorowicz, 2005).  
 
In addition to the conceptual models offered by social scientists, several law enforcement 
and security agencies have developed and disseminated their own ideas about the 
radicalization process. The US Federal Bureau of Investigation (2006) has described the 
radicalization process, based principally on how it might apply to converts to Islam 
within the US, as comprising four sequential stages:  Pre-radicalization; Identification; 
Indoctrination; and Action. Similarly, the New York Police department (Silber & Bjhatt, 
2007)
 
with input from terrorism researchers and other experts, suggest that citizens of a 
Western home-country who ultimately adopt a Jihadi-Salafi ideology do so through a 
linear four stage process as follows:  Pre-radicalization; Self-Identification (exploring 
and adopting the ideological tenets); Indoctrination (intensifies beliefs and commitment 
to the ideas); and Jihadization (believe they have an individual duty to participate in 
[terrorist activities]). Finally, the Danish Ministry of Justice‘s (2007) report on home 
grown terrorism and Islamist radicalization in Europe also asserts that radicalization 
occurs in four stages:  Pre-radicalization; Conversion and identification; Conviction and 
indoctrination; and Action.   
 
Though the conceptual models posed by each of these three agencies are certainly 
consistent with each other and have become quite popular among some law enforcement 
groups, they seem more appropriately to describe a linear sequence of stages rather than a 
―process‖ or pathway.  Moreover, the accuracy and stability of this type of sequence 
model has not been rigorously tested.   
 
Two recent integrative approaches have been attempted.  One is a general framework of 
political radicalization, based on social psychological principles (McCauley & 
Moskalenko, 2009).  They identify key ―mechanisms‖ of radicalization at individual, 
group, and mass-public levels, concluding that the following twelve are most prominent:   
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Personal victimization;  
Political grievance;  
Joining a radical group—the slippery slope;  
Joining a radical group—the power of love;  
Extremity shift in like-minded groups;  
Extreme cohesion under isolation and threat;  
Competition for the same base of support;  
Competition with state power—condensation;  
Within-group competition—fissioning;  
Jujitsu politics;  
Hate; and  
Martyrdom.    
 
The second is a project by The Joint Military Information Support Centre (JMISC) of the 
US Special Operations Command to discern ―common factors‖ across different models of 
radicalization and terrorist psychology.  The JMISC effort is described in detail in 
Chapter XX (Drummond, xxxx).   
 
Empirical Research:   Despite a surge in terrorism-related publications since 2001 and 
the burst of recent interest in radicalization, empirical studies are rare.  Marc Sageman 
(2008), a forensic psychiatrist and former CIA Case Officer, has reviewed and collected 
information from media and open source documents (e.g. courtroom testimony) on a 
series of Al-Qaeda related cases, though the exact nature of the methodology employed is 
not immediately apparent from the published documents.  He has discerned four ―prongs‖ 
of radicalization - a sense of moral outrage, a specific interpretation of the world, 
resonance with personal experiences, and mobilization through networks – but concludes 
that these do not comprise stages, nor are they necessarily sequential. 
 
Similarly, Hegghammer (2006) analyzed 240 biographies – including 70 ―extensive‖ 
ones - of (post-2002) Saudi militants, compiled over a two-year period from a broad 
range of primary and secondary sources, mostly in Arabic.  He also conducted numerous 
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interviews with former radicals as well as families and acquaintances of militants. He 
framed the analyses to ask who joined ―al-Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula‖ [QAP] and 
why, and –to facilitate comparisons - what radicalization and recruitment factors might 
be specific to Saudi Arabia.    
 
With a more in-depth and individualized focus, John Horgan (2009), recently conducted a 
series of 52 semi-structured interviews (29 former terrorists and 23 of their supporters, 
family members and friends) over an 18-month period from late-2006 to early-2008, 
producing some deeply personal, detailed and complex portrayals of former terrorists in 
Belfast, Beirut, Oslo, London, Paris, Tripoli, Jakarta and elsewhere . 
 
Perhaps the most systematic and comprehensive effort to date to develop ―data-based‖ 
knowledge on violent radicalization has been conducted not by academics, but by MI5‘s 
Behavioural Science Unit.  Their analysis is based on in-depth case studies on "several 
hundred individuals known to be involved in, or closely associated with, violent extremist 
activity" ranging from fundraising to planning suicide bombings in the UK.  An overview 
of their findings was published in June 2008 in an "operational briefing note" titled:  
―Understanding Radicalisation and Violent Extremism in the UK.‖  The document is 
marked as "UK restricted", but its contents have been widely reported in the British 
media.   Among their key findings, MI5 notes that no profile or single pathway to 
extremism existed.  In most cases they note that some vulnerability existed that made the 
person receptive to the ideology, but as with earlier studies, the process of becoming 
―radicalized‖ appears to have occurred over time (Travis, 2008).  
 
 
Terrorist Ideology  
 
Ideology is often defined as a common and broadly agreed upon set of rules to which an 
individual subscribes, which help to regulate and determine behaviour. Ideology guides 
and controls behaviour perhaps by providing a set of behavioural contingencies that link 
immediate behaviour and actions to long-term positive outcomes and rewards, or it may 
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best be viewed as a form of rule-following behaviour. Culture is also a critical factor in 
the development of ideology, but its impact on terrorist ideologies specifically, has not 
been studied (Borum, 2004). 
 
Ideologies that support terrorism, while quite diverse, appear to serve some common 
functions: they must provide a set of beliefs that guide and justify a series of behavioural 
mandates; those beliefs must be inviolable and must be neither questionable nor 
questioned; and the behaviours must be goal directed and seen as serving some cause or 
meaningful objective.  A related question is whether common structures or patterns might 
exist across violent extremist ideologies, even when the content of the beliefs is 
dramatically different (Borum, 2004).   
 
One simplistic approach, developed more as a teaching tool than as a social science 
theory, discerned four main characteristics of these ideologies summarized with the 
acronym PATH: 
 
 Polarized: The essence of which is an ―us vs. them‖ mindset, or what some 
would regard as in-group – out-group conflict. 
 
 Absolutist: The beliefs are regarded as truth in the absolute sense, sometimes 
supported by sacred authority. This squelches questioning, critical thinking, 
and dissent. It also adds moral authority to framing us vs. them as a 
competition between good and bad (or evil). 
 
 
 Threat-Oriented: External threat causes in-groups to cohere. Good leaders 
know this intuitively, if not from reading social psychological research. They 
persistently remind adherents that the ―us‖ is at risk from the ―them.‖ Because 
the ―us‖ is seen as being good or right in the absolute sense, this works not 
only to promote internal cohesion but also external opposition. 
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 Hateful: Hate energizes violent action. It allows principled opposition to impel 
direct action. It also facilitates various mechanisms of moral disengagement – 
such as dehumanization – which erode the social and psychological barriers to 
engaging in violence that one believes is ―justified‖ (an important point, since 
many more people endorse the justification for extremist violence than 
actually commit such acts). 
 
More recently, Gerard Saucier – a social psychologist at University of Oregon – and his 
international team of colleagues sought to investigate this same question somewhat more 
systematically and on a larger scale (Saucier, et al, 2009).  They began with a rationally-
derived ―working model of the major components of the militant-extremist mind-set,‖ 
then collected books, printed and web-based material from militant-extremist individuals 
or groups to see how often certain themes appeared. The project wished to include a 
broad range of groups, so they deliberately chose at least one from each of seven world 
regions. ―To qualify, a group had to have been active within the last 150 years, had to fit 
the definition of militant extremism, and also had to have had a record of actual violence 
involving the death of multiple persons outside the group. A qualifying group also had to 
have sufficient written documentary evidence (i.e., original statements) that would clearly 
indicate its mind-set‖ (Saucier, et al, 2009, p. 258). 
 
The precise methodology and procedures used are a bit sketchy.  Saucier scanned these 
extremist documents looking for the presence of themes, then judged which themes were 
present in multiple statements ―when, in Saucier's judgment, a reasonable person hearing 
the set of statements would acknowledge them to be making the same essential point" 
(Saucier, et al, 2009, p. 259). It is not clear from the described methodology, whether a 
coding scheme was used or whether any check was done on the inter-rater reliability of 
theme identification.  Nevertheless, the authors identified 16 themes characteristic of a 
militant-extremist mind-set ―based on fairly obvious correspondences that emerged in 
repeated reviews of the extracted statements. Each of these 16 themes was found to occur 
in three or more groups‖ (Saucier, et al, 2009, p. 259). 
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1. The necessity of unconventional and extreme measures. 
2. Use of tactics that function to absolve one of responsibility for the bad 
consequences of the violence one is advocating or carrying out. 
3. Prominent mixtures of military terminology into areas of discourse 
where it is otherwise rarely found. 
4. Perception that the ability of the group to reach its rightful position is 
being tragically obstructed 
5. Glorifying the past, in reference to one's group. 
6. Utopianizing. There is frequently reference to concepts of a future 
paradise, or at least "the promise of a long and glorious future" 
7. Catastrophizing. There is a perception that great calamities either have 
occurred, are occurring, or will occur. 
8. Anticipation of supernatural intervention: Miraculous powers 
attributed to one's side, miraculous events coming to help one's side, or 
commands coming from supernatural entities. 
9. A felt imperative to annihilate (exterminate, crush, destroy) evil and/or 
purify the world entirely from evil. 
10. Glorification of dying for the cause. 
11. Duty and obligation to kill, or to make offensive war. 
12. Machiavellianism in service of the "sacred." This theme involves the 
belief that those with the right (i.e., true) beliefs and values are entitled 
to use immoral ends if necessary to assure the success of their cause. 
13. An elevation of intolerance, vengeance, and warlikeness into virtues 
(or nearly so), including, in some cases, the ascribing of such militant 
dispositions to supernatural entities. 
14. Dehumanizing or demonizing of opponents. 
15. The modern world as a disaster. Among militant extremists, there is 
commonly a perception that modernity, including the consumer 
society and even instances of successful economic progress, is actually 
a disaster for humanity. 
16. Civil government as illegitimate. 
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The authors suggest that militant-extremist groups use these thematic elements to craft a 
―narrative‖ frame for their ideologies. Drawing on these 16 themes, they offer the 
following of how they might cohere in a narrative: 
 
―We (i.e., our group, however defined) have a glorious past, but modernity has 
been disastrous, bringing on a great catastrophe in which we are tragically 
obstructed from reaching our rightful place, obstructed by an illegitimate civil 
government and/or by an enemy so evil that it does not even deserve to be called 
human. This intolerable situation calls for vengeance. Extreme measures are 
required; indeed, any means will be justified for realizing our sacred end. We 
must think in military terms to annihilate this evil and purify the world of it. It is a 
duty to kill the perpetrators of evil, and we cannot be blamed for carrying out this 
violence. Those who sacrifice themselves in our cause will attain glory, and 
supernatural powers should come to our aid in this struggle. In the end, we will 
bring our people to a new world that is a paradise‖ (Saucier, et al, 2009, p. 265). 
 
 
Terrorist Recruitment 
 
Surprisingly little research or analysis has been conducted on terrorist recruitment (Daly 
and Gerwehr, 2006). Some debate even exists among contemporary scholars about the 
nature and extent of terrorist recruitment into militant jihadism. Marc Sageman and Scott 
Atran, for example, both well-known terrorism researchers, have argued that there is no 
recruitment per se to jihad or to Al-Qaeda.  They believe that ―enlistment‖ (because 
people want to join) is the mechanism by which new militants emerge.  They report 
having data to show that nearly 90% ―join the jihad‖ through friendship and kinship 
(Sageman, 2004).  While it seems reasonable to assert that traditional recruitment - as the 
military does with a dedicated budget and personnel – may not be terrorists‘ modus 
operandi, it seems nearly incontrovertible that militants seek new supporters, activists 
and members and that they engage in active efforts influence others to adopt their point 
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of view.  That is arguably just a broader conceptualization of recruitment.  How they do it 
becomes a very different field of debate than whether they do it.   
 
Social movement scholars have studied activist recruitment for decades.  One of the 
prevailing concepts is that when members of the movement look to recruit others, they 
operate as ―rational prospectors‖ (Brady et al., 1999).  They want to be efficient and 
effective, so they seek to identify those most likely to agree to act, if asked, and to act 
effectively to further the cause.  They  ―conceive of the recruitment process as having two 
stages:  (1) Rational prospectors use information to find likely targets; (2) after locating 
them, recruiters offer information on participatory opportunities and deploy inducements 
to persuade recruits to say ‗yes‘‖ (Brady, et al., 1999, p. 154.)  Central to both tasks is the 
existence and strength of relationships.  Understanding relationships among potential 
prospects is critical to understanding recruitment networks.   
 
 
 
 
Terrorist Mobilization 
 
Ideology, by itself, is generally not sufficient to create a terrorist.  Not all extremist 
ideologies facilitate violence, nor are all extremists violent. One potentially useful 
distinction to consider is the ―direction of activity;‖ that is, whether the focus is more on 
promotion of the ―cause‖ or destruction of those who oppose it. Even within destruction-
oriented extremism, however, it usually takes more than ideology to compel violent 
action.  
 
Getting people to act in service of a cause, not just to espouse a set of beliefs or maintain 
nominal allegiance to a group (what some refer to as ―radicalization‖), is a process that 
social movement theorists call mobilization (Zald & McCarthy, 1987). Working from the 
assumptions of a rational actor model of behaviour, mobilizing people to act involves 
increasing their perceived benefits and minimizing the perceived costs.  These 
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assumptions cohere with basic approach-avoidance psychological models of human 
motivation (Elliott & Church, 1997).   
 
The perceived benefits or terrorism – such as a sense of belonging, personal meaning, and 
approval of god/others – were discussed earlier, but manipulating ―costs‖ is also a critical 
factor in mobilization (Munger, 2006).  Many more people believe that violence in 
service of a particular cause is justified than actually commit acts of extremist violence.  
Activists must provide incentives, but also remove disincentives.  They must leverage the 
psychological and social influences to erode the powerful, naturally-occurring barriers 
that inhibit widespread human killing.  The barriers often involve how we think that 
others will appraise our behaviour well as our own self-appraisal.  The avenues of assault 
on those barriers may be externally (i.e., effects of the group or social environment) or 
internally driven (i.e., making an internal cognitive adjustment about how to perceive the 
environment or situation).  
 
Four of the major group/external influences to reduce psychological ―costs‖ are diffusion 
of responsibility, deindividualtion, obedience, and social identity. Diffusion of 
responsibility is a social-psychological phenomenon by which individuals feel less 
responsible (or less culpable) for transgressive behaviour when they commit it either in 
the presence of, or on behalf of a group (Darley & Latane, 1968).  Deindividuation is a 
state or situation in which the focus of judgment is on a collective rather than on an 
individual.  This reduces an individual‘s inhibition or restraint either by reducing their 
self-awareness or by facilitating conformity to situation-specific norms (Silke, 2003). 
Obedience to authority is another phenomenon that diminishes personal responsibility 
because the actor, transfers his moral agency from self to the authority (Milgram, 1983).  
Finally, social identities (Tajfel & Turner, 1986)  - the ways in which we view ourselves 
in relation to social groups or categories – also can weaken individual responsibility by 
boosting the salience of group norms. 
 
Eroding internal psychological barriers to violence typically requires modifying self-
appraisals.  Once humans have developed a basic capacity to control their behaviour and 
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regulate their actions, their internal moral code typically guides their choices.  Violating 
one‘s own moral code may bring negative self-appraisals and feelings of self-
condemnation (Bandura, 1990, 2004).  Psychologist Albert Bandura notes, however, that 
these self-sanctions can be selectively ―activated and disengaged‖ to facilitate behaviour 
that would otherwise violate one‘s own moral standard.  He describes this process of 
breaking down barriers as ―moral disengagement‖, which can operate through a variety 
of processes.  One way to remove the barrier of self-sanction is to change one‘s 
interpretation or appraisal of events so that they justify the act (moral justification).  
Terrorists typically have some justification for their action, whether it is personally 
construed or derived from the group‘s ideology.  A second mechanism is ―blaming the 
victim,‖ since targeting aggression at people who have caused harm or are considered 
blameworthy or deserving of retribution is more acceptable. Another mechanism of moral 
disengagement is to dehumanize the victims in one‘s personal appraisals.  Della Porta 
(1992), for example, describes how Italian ―militants justified their use of political 
violence by depersonalizing their victims, defined in the documents of the underground 
groups as "tools of the system" and, later as ‗pigs‘ or ‗watch dogs‘.‖    
 
 
Terrorist Group Vulnerabilities 
 
Terrorist groups, like all social collectives, have certain vulnerabilities to their existence 
(Cronin, 2006; Jackson, 2009). Some come from within the organization, some operate 
from outside.  Internal mistrust, for example, can be a disabling affliction for a group.  It 
causes member to focus energy inward and not externally toward operations or goal 
directed activity; it potentiates interpersonal tensions and strains relationships. Periods of 
boredom and inactivity can also threaten group cohesion.  McCauley and Segal (1989, 
p.177) note that ―without action and external threat, the group may destroy itself.‖  
Internal competitions and power struggles can undermine group unity and effectiveness.     
Substantive disagreements about tactics, strategy or leadership are also frequent sources 
of vulnerability, particularly when they lead to factioning.   
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External vulnerabilities include disruption in the support network, disapproval of 
constituencies, and conflicts with other groups.  No political or ideologically-driven 
organization can survive and thrive without a support network.  ―The types of support are 
financial, training, weapons, organizational, and operational.  A group must be able to 
raise the resources necessary to provide sufficient incentives to attract and maintain a 
membership.‖  (Oots, 1989, p.166).    Beyond the instrumental support network is a 
broader social network of sympathizers, which comprise the constituency of a terrorist 
organization.  Changes in the attitudes of the supporters can lead to changes in the 
organization (Cronin, 2006).  Finally, conflicts that arise between groups can threaten the 
integrity or even the very existence of a terrorist organization as well (McCauley & 
Segal, 1987).   
 
 
Terrorist Group Functioning 
 
Terrorist groups must be able to maintain both cohesion and loyalty to sustain their 
existence (Jackson, 2009). Leadership can be an important factor in that effort.  While the 
prototypical terrorist group leader is believed to capitalize on his or her charisma, the 
truth is that extremist leaders operate in a variety of ways and sometimes change over 
time.  Terrorist groups require that certain functions be served, regardless of how they are 
stylistically implemented.  First, the group needs a guardian to maintain its collective 
belief system, to deter dissent, and prevent ideological or commitment drift.  A related 
aspect of this function is diverting conflict externally and maintaining a persistent sense 
of threat from the adversary.  Second, a group must have organizational routines that help 
to keep action going, since boredom and inactivity are enemies of cohesion.  Third, the 
flow of communication through the organization must be managed and controlled, so that 
the group‘s identity and narrative are carefully preserved.  Fourth, incentives must be 
managed and manipulated to attract new members and to keep existing members focused 
on group objectives and motivated to act (Borum, 2004).  
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Conclusion on the State of Research  
 
Social science researchers in the field of terrorism studies are nearly unanimous in their 
conclusion that research in this field of study largely lacks substance and rigor (Gurr, 
1988, Schmid & Longman, 1988; Silke, 2001; Horgan, 2005; Victoroff, 2005; Victoroff 
&  Kruglanski, 2009). Several fundamental problems remain unresolved.  First, there still 
is no agreed upon definition of terrorism, though more than 100 different ones have been 
proposed in the professional literature (Levy & Sidel, 2003).  Second, most of the 
existing research is not empirical or based on any data.  Silke‘s (2001) review found that 
80% of terrorism research articles published between 1995-1999  were ―thought pieces‖ 
or based on information taken from media  sources, with less than 20% providing 
substantially new knowledge  based on previously unavailable data.  Third, psychological 
researchers who have more of an empirical orientation seem to focus on questions that 
either lose the focus on observable behaviour, or are disconnected from issues that are 
important to practitioners.  This is not meant to suggest that only applied research in 
terrorism studies holds any value.  Rigorous basic social/behavioural science research on 
terrorism-related processes would also be welcome, and might provide a foundation of 
knowledge for an empirically- informed psychology of counterterrorism.   
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